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Abstract 
This paper proposes the use of Central Register of Beneficial Owners (CRB) laid down in the 
Fourth Anti Money Laundering Directive (4MLD) as a model instrument towards identifying 
beneficial ownership in international tax law. Although the OECD affirmed in 2014 that the term 
'beneficial owner' “must be distinguished from the different meaning…in the context of other 
instruments”, the inclusion of tax evasion as a crime covered by the 4AMLD renders the CRB 
valuable in solving tax treaty cases on beneficial ownership. 
Purposively, the use of CRB greatly supports the EU tax transparency agenda, which requires that 
Member States actively engaged in Exchange of Information (EoI) cooperation. The effectiveness 
of EoI is ensured by, among others, the accurateness of information stored in each Member States. 
The CRB also calls for protection of taxpayers data, as access to it can only be granted to parties 
with legitimate interests, and must accord with the secondary laws on data protection. The 
coherence of these policies strongly supports for wider and optimized use of CRB in the future. 
Keywords: central register; beneficial owner; tax treaty 
1. Introduction 
The insertion of the term ‘beneficial owner’ into the 1977 OECD Model Tax Conventions on 
Income and Capital (OECD MC) had led to uncertainty as to the meaning of the term within the 
implementation of bilateral tax treaties. Case laws brought before courts in different jurisdictions 
have attempted at ascertaining the meaning of the term and implementing that meaning in the 
present case in accordance with facts and circumstances upheld during the trials. For tax authorities 
of the state in which the income is sourced, judgments of these cases will determine whether the 
granting of treaty benefits (e.g. withholding tax rates that is lower than the rates prescribed in 
domestic income tax law) accords with the genuineness of the underlying transactions performed by 
taxpayers. Meanwhile, for the taxpayers, including multinational corporations, judgments of these 
cases will determine whether the allocation of substantive business activities to its entities located 
in different jurisdictions have satisfied an acceptable level of international tax planning. 
Evolvement of the term have witnessed no less than 2 landmark cases, namely Indofood 
International Finance, Ltd. v JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A., London Branch, UK Court of Appeal 
[2006] EWCA Civ 158, and Her Majesty the Queen v. Prèvost Car Inc. Tax Court of Canada  
(2008TCC231). As observed by Castro,1 the approach used in the former is closest to anti-
avoidance measure, whereas in the latter case, the judge deployed more efforts as to assert meaning 
to the term ‘beneficial owner’, as well as defining the role and scope of intermediary holding 
corporations. He further argued, however, that these cases did not contribute in resolving the 
combining issues of “(…) lack of express definition in OECD MC and its commentaries, together 
with doctrinal discussion on the legal or economic approach to its concept, added the intersection of 
this subject with anti-abuse measures”.2 In any circumstance, the above UK and Canada cases have 
taught us that a person beneficial owner will have “the full privilege to directly benefit from the 
income”3 and subject to “use, enjoyment, risks, and control” of the income.4 
                                                        
  Lecturer at Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia). Doctor of Laws (LL.D.) candidate at Faculty of 
Law, University of Helsinki (Finland). The author wishes to thank Prof. Marjaana Helminen for her precious 
comments on the article, and Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan (LPDP/Indonesian Endowment Fund for 
Education) for its support towards the author’s doctoral education. E-mail: adrianto.dwi@mail.ugm.ac.id. 
1  Leonardo F. M. Castro, “Concept of Beneficial Owner in Tax Treaties: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff 
through Case Law Method Internationally”, International Tax Journal, July–August 2013, at p.25. 
2  Leonardo F. M. Castro, id. 
3  Indofood International Finance, Ltd. v JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A., London Branch, para. [42]. 
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Without undermining the judicial efforts devoted to define the term, legislative efforts have 
also been deployed by states as to lay down measures that are able to pinpoint beneficial owners in 
cross-border income transactions. Within the EU, references to beneficial owner can be found in its 
secondary law, namely Directive 2015/849/EU5 of 20 May 2015, or the Fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (4AMLD). The EU Commission Proposal COM(2016)450 of 5 July 20166 
has set up for the fifth amendment of the AMLD. As an instrument designed to simultaneously 
combat money laundering, tax evasion, and financing of terrorism, implementation of the 
instrument raises the issue as to whether it is of value in addressing the issue of beneficial 
ownership for bilateral tax treaty purposes. The absence of a specific directive on the latter issue, 
however, renders the 4AMLD being the primary resort.7  
Identification of beneficial owners within the 4AMLD is done through a centralized 
registration of beneficial owners. These registers are to be held in each Member State. This paper 
seeks to establish that these registers are valuable within initial analysis towards identifying 
beneficial owner for bilateral tax treaty purposes. Furthermore, this paper argues that the Central 
Register of Beneficial Owners (hereinafter, the CRB) may become a model instrument in unveiling 
beneficial ownership for tax treaty purposes. Although the EU territoriality principle limits the 
scope of application of the instrument within its territories, key elements forming the instrument are 
unrestricted for adoption by other states outside the EU. It is conceded that data and information 
extracted from the registers are not in themselves able to resolve the beneficial ownership dispute in 
a given tax case. Legal and economic circumstances of each transaction must also be taken into 
consideration when determining beneficial ownership. Meanwhile, the accuracy and protection of 
taxpayers’ information currently developed within the CRB may as well establish legal certainty 
towards the issue of beneficial ownership in international tax law.  
Contextually, the use of CRB for tax treaty purposes are strongly linked to the EU tax 
transparency agenda, including exchange of information cooperation and protection of taxpayers 
data. As will be discussed in the next section, the agenda requires that Member States, by virtue of  
the Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011,8 are engaging in mutual exchange of 
information for tax purposes. In doing so, Member States must also maintain that every data 
subject, including taxpayers, is entitled to a certain level of protection prescribed in Directive 
2016/680/EU of 27 April 2016.9 Simultaneously, this Directive also limits the use of data and 
information stored in the CRB. Practically, access to the CRB can be granted only to persons with 
legitimate purpose, although one may argue that wider access to the register may improve accuracy 
of information. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4  Her Majesty the Queen v. Prèvost Car Inc. Tax Court of Canada (2008TCC231), para. [100]. 
5  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2015/849/EU of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use 
of financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/060/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/070/EC, [2015] OJ L141/73, or the 4AMLD. 
Relevant secondary laws include Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/101/EU on 
coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and third parties, are required by 
Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of article 48 of the Treaty, with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent, 16 September 2009, [2009] OJ L258/11. 
6  The European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, 5 July 2016, COM(2016)450 final. 
7  The term ‘beneficial owner’ was not, for example, addressed in Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 
laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (the 
Anti-avoidance Directive), [2016] OJ L193/1. 
8  Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and 
repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, [2011] OJ L 64/1, or the Administrative Cooperation Directive. 
9  Directive 2016/680/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, [2016] OJ L 119/89. 
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Based on the above elaboration, the central question of this paper is “can the EU CRB be used 
as a model instrument in unveiling beneficial owners for  tax treaty purposes?” In order to answer 
the question, analysis of this paper is devoted to factors that may support the use of CRB as model 
instrument in unveiling beneficial ownership for tax purposes. A normative study would be 
deployed as to determine whether the CRB may be used as a model instrument in unveiling 
beneficial ownership for tax purposes. It does not, therefore, include practical experiences of the 
CRB, if any. Current developments reveal that the Council is still within intensive communications 
with the Parliament in adopting the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which included 
enhanced policies on access to the CRB. The fifth President-compromised texts to the proposal 
includes stronger commitment to the rights of individuals to privacy, while maintaining that 
Member States should, for the objective of enhancing “(…) transparency of business transactions 
and financial system,” grant wider public access to the CRB.10 The proper balancing to such public 
access is achieved through online registration of requesting parties, and to fully abolished the 
possibility to grant access to authorities of third states.11   
2. Central registration as model instrument to unveil beneficial owner of income 
In this section, factors that support the use of CRB as instrument in unveiling beneficial 
owners for tax purposes will be analyzed. First, the comprehensiveness of information to be stored 
into the CRB. Details on the legal and economic nature of cross-border business transactions 
determine the usefulness of the CRB for tax purposes. Second, the transparent and practical use of 
data and information stored in the CRB. The crucial policy choice in this matter is whether to 
restrict or to grant wider access to the CRB. Restrictive access leads to higher protection to 
individuals’ privacy, whereas wider access may improve the quality and quantity of information 
stored in the CRB. Contextually, coherent tax transparency policies have enabled the CRB to play 
an important role in unveiling beneficial ownership for tax purposes. The established links amongst 
rules and regulations on exchange of information for tax purposes, data protection, and anti-money 
laundering have improved the usefulness of the CRB in unveiling beneficial ownership for tax 
purposes. Third, the protective measures to prevent misuse of taxpayers information. This is done 
not only by acknowledging the rules and regulations on data protection, but also the use of 
“legitimate interest” measure in granting access to the CRB. Safe transmission and limitations on 
information exchange are also key elements The objective of this section is to establish that the 
CRB should indeed be a model instrument in unveiling beneficial ownership for tax treaty purposes. 
2.1. Comprehensiveness of beneficial ownership information stored within the CRB 
The effort to hold a centralized registration of beneficial owners is derived from, among 
others, the idea that it is necessary to “(…) identify any natural person who exercises ownership or 
control over legal entity”.12 Valid and recent information on beneficial owners “(…) is a key factor 
in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind a corporate structure”.13 For that 
objective, Member States are obliged to acquire and maintain data and information on beneficial 
ownership, as prescribed in Article 30 of the 4AMLD. Furthermore, these data and information 
must be held in “adequate, accurate, and current” manners (Article 30(4) of 4AMLD) and must 
include the information on the “beneficial interests held” (Article 30(1) of 4AMLD). As a measure 
to unveil beneficial owners, the CRB may contain data and information that best determine legal 
ownership of assets from which income might be generated. When combined with other data and 
information on economic circumstances of the transaction, then one is able to determine whether 
taxpayers in different jurisdictions are performing legitimate transactions or only for the purpose of 
benefiting from provisions of bilateral tax treaties. 
                                                        
10  The European Council, Fifth Presidency Compromise to COM(2016)450, 15605/16, 19 December 2016, at 
Preamble para. [35] and para. [35a]. 
11  The European Council, id., at Preamble para. [22a] and para. [35a]. 
12  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [12]. 
13  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [14]. 
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Within the EU, Article 3(6) of 4AMLD defines beneficial owner as “any natural person(s) 
who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a 
transaction or activity is being conducted”. The key element of this definition is “control”, which is 
determined by way of share ownership, voting rights, ownership interests, and “control via other 
means”.14 Entities upon which control is exercised in this directive include corporations, trusts, and 
other legal entities such as foundations. In the case of corporations, the Commission has proposed a 
more restrictive shareholding requirement for entities that “(…) are mostly used as an intermediary 
structure between the assets or income and the ultimate beneficial owner”, which can be 
distinguished from those which are “(…) genuine commercial corporate entities”.15 The directive 
obliges Member States to expand the scope of legal entities and lay down more restrictive 
shareholding requirement in order to establish “effective transparency”.16  
It should be acknowledged that the OECD had, in its 2014 Update on the OECD Model Tax 
Conventions on Income and Capital (OECD MC), affirmed that the meaning of “beneficial owners” 
within Article 10, 11, and 12 on cross-border payment of dividends, interests, and royalties17 “(…) 
must be distinguished from the different meaning that has been given to that term in the context of 
other instruments that concern the determination of the persons (typically the individuals) that 
exercise ultimate control over entities or assets”.18 The main concern of the OECD was that 
references of beneficial owners to individuals having the eventual control over a corporation would 
not specifically solve the issue arises from the use of the words “paid to” as concerns payment of 
dividend, interests, and royalties, but instead the issue related to the ownership of the underlying 
shares, debt-claims, property or rights.19 Nevertheless, the inclusion of tax evasion as a crime to be 
fought against by the 4AMLD indicate its enlarged scope of application to tax matters, larger than 
that set out by the FATF report. The Commission opined that it is essential to highlight that ‘tax 
crimes’ relating to direct and indirect taxes are included in the broad definition of ‘criminal activity’ 
in the 4AMLD, as suggested in the revised FATF Recommendations.20 
As regards specification of data and information to be acquired by entities established in any 
Member State, the 4AMLD specified some types of information that may be useful in unveiling 
beneficial ownership, namely “(…) the name, the month and year of birth, the nationality and the 
country of residence of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial 
interest held”.21 Apparently, these types of information have a face value to unveil legal ownership, 
as distinguished from beneficial ownership. In order to be able to pinpoint beneficial owners of 
assets and income, Member States must enhance their laws as to ensure that customer due diligence 
performed by financial entities established in their territories are able to reveal the economic nature 
of transactions performed by the latter’s customers. This may include information concerning all 
entities and natural persons associated with an entity of a Member State. As for transactions 
involving persons domiciled in “high-risk third states”,22 obliged entities must seek for further 
information concerning, among others, the “intended nature of business relationships”, “source of 
funds or source of wealth of customers”, and “reasons for the intended or performed transactions”.23 
                                                        
14  The 4AMLD, Article 3(6)(a)(i). 
15  The European Commission, COM(2016)450, supra 6, p.19, at para. [18]. 
16  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [12]. 
17  OECD, “2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention”, revised para.12.6 of commentary on Article 10, 
revised para.10.4 of commentary to Article 11, and  revised para.4.5 of commentary on Article 12. 
18  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations in its 2012 International Standards on Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, is an illustration of that “other instruments”. 
19  OECD, supra 17, revised para.4.5 of commentary on Article 12. 
20  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [11]. 
21  The European Council, supra 10, proposed amendment to Article 30(5) of the 4AMLD. 
22  See: The 4AMLD, Article 9(2). See also: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 
supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk 
third countries with strategic deficiencies, [2016] OJ L 254/1. 
23  The European Council, supra 10, proposed insertion of Article 18a into the 4AMLD. 
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Based on the above provisions, it can be concluded that data and information on beneficial 
owners as prescribed in the 4AMLD and its proposed amendments have objectives beyond 
disclosure of legal ownership of assets and income, namely to unveil their beneficial owners. The 
multi purposes of the Directive is, however, preventing one from being able to conclude that 
fulfillment of beneficial owner requirements by virtue of this law will entitle (or, disregard) a 
person the benefits of bilateral tax treaties. Information such as source of funds or nature of 
business relationships are not in themselves able to deny tax benefits resulted from any tax 
avoidance scheme, the performance of which hinders the proper functioning of tax treaty 
provisions. Thus, a measure by which legal entities are obliged to identify beneficial owners of their 
shares and to identify their customers, whose assets and income are managed or flown through such 
legal entities, should only be utilized as an entry point for tax authorities or judiciaries to determine 
beneficial ownership of assets and income. Information within the CRB can reveal all entities 
involved in business transactions, but attribution of income and its subsequent taxation are matters 
to be settled through references to domestic and international tax laws.  
It can be concluded from the above elaborations that the CRB is, to the extent of identification 
of potential persons having beneficial interests in assets or income, a useful instrument in 
addressing beneficial ownership issues found in double tax conventions. The types of information 
stored in the CRB are also inline with the typical information which, according to the OECD, would 
be of the interests of tax authorities, namely taxpayers’ identity (e.g. name, address, taxpayer 
identification number, place and date of birth), (financial) account number, the account balance or 
value, and total gross amount of (depository account) interests.24 The OECD’s concern that 
individuals’ effective control of assets and income—being the object of CRB—would be 
insufficient in addressing tax treaty cases involving corporation beneficial owners, may not entirely 
be accepted.25 It is worth noting that the 4AMLD has acknowledged that “(…) identification and 
verification of beneficial owners should, where relevant, extend to legal entities that own other legal 
entities”.26 It is, therefore, conclusive that the CRB cannot be disregarded as a tool for unveiling 
beneficial owners for the sole reason of not having corporation beneficial owners as its main object. 
In fact, this would be the ideal approach to identify beneficial owners of closely-held corporations.  
Data and information acquired from financial entities are pooled in a centralized registration 
of beneficial owners. This register, which is to be held “(…) in a central register located outside the 
company”,27 represents a recent attempt to identify beneficial ownership, particularly in the EU. 
The comprehensiveness of data and information stored in the CRB is therefore also assured by the  
implementation of the exchange of information in the field of taxation as governed in the 
Administrative Cooperation Directive. For the purposes of that Directive, exchange of information 
is performed “(…) based on a request made by the requesting Member State to the requested 
Member State in a specific case”.28 Amongst the information that can be requested is “(…) 
ownership of and income from immovable property”.29 Implementation of this directive also 
corresponds to Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010.30 
                                                        
24  OECD (2014), “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters”, OECD 
Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216525-en, Model Competent Authority Agreement, Section 2(1). 
25  OECD, “2014 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention”, supra 17, revised paragraph 12.3 of commentary to 
Article 10, revised para. 10.1 of commentary to Article 11, revised para. 4.2 of commentary to Article 12. In that 
paragraph, the OECD argued that “(…) a conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, 
though the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation to the income 
concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the interested parties”. 
26  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [13]. 
27  The 4AMLD, at Preamble para. [14]. 
28  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 3 number 8. 
29  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 3(1)(e). 
30  Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to 
taxes, duties and other measures, [2010] OJ L 84/1, or the Mutual Assistance Directive. 
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It is therefore worth seeking whether information stored in the CRB are useful for the 
upcoming exchange of tax information cooperation. Within the latter cooperation, the types of 
acquired and transmitted information vary according to the mode of information exchange. Within 
the exchange of information by request,31 there is virtually no limitations as to which data and 
information can be acquired and transmitted. Article 5(1) of Administrative Cooperation Directive 
confers that the requested authority of Member State must inform the requesting authority of a 
Member State any information that it possesses or obtains which are  of foreseeable relevance to the 
administration and enforcement of domestic laws of Member State of the requesting authority.32 
Similarly, types of information acquired and transmitted within the spontaneous exchange of 
information33 are also  limitless, except that such exchange mode can only be deployed on specific 
occasions, including when a transaction involves persons interposed between principal actors 
located in the sending Member State and the receiving Member State.34 On this occasion, 
information extracted from the CRB may be of useful in identifying interposed persons within 
cross-border transactions. Lastly, any information available in the tax files of a Member State which 
is retrievable in accordance with the procedures for gathering and processing information in that 
Member State35 may be transmitted for the purpose of automatic exchange of information.36 The 
specific reference to “tax files of Member State” has reduced the usefulness of CRB in this mode of 
information exchange, as information within the CRB are not filed by tax authorities of Member 
States, but rather financial entities located in Member States. Extension of the CRB as to reach tax 
files in all Member States will enrich the information bulk in the CRB. 
Based on the above elaboration in subsection 2.1., it can be concluded that the holding of 
CRB strongly links to the exchange of tax information cooperation within the EU. Information 
stored in the CRB forms major part of information that may be transmitted within the information 
exchange cooperation. Efforts deployed in obtaining and maintaining accurate and current 
information on taxpayers information are tantamount to those deployed in establishing an effective 
information exchange cooperation in order to safeguard the EU budgetary functions. Inherent to 
that proportion, on 5 July 2016, the Commission has proposed for amendment of Administrative 
Cooperation Directive as regards access to anti-money laundering information by tax authorities.37 
The proposed amendment38 had included the plea for access to beneficial ownership information, 
which is aggregated in CRB of each Member State, to fall within the scope of Administrative 
Cooperation Directive.  This proposal will harness the link between the Administrative Cooperation 
Directive and the Anti-Money Laundering Directive. For the purpose of this article, this established 
link supports for the use of CRB as model instrument in unveiling beneficial ownership. 
                                                        
31  Article 3 point 8 of Administrative Cooperation Directive defines ‘exchange of information by request’ as “the 
exchange of information based on a request made by the requesting Member State to the requested Member State in 
a specific case. 
32  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 1(1). 
33  Article 3 point 10 of Administrative Cooperation Directive, defines ‘spontaneous exchange’ as “the non-systematic 
communication, at any moment and without prior request, of information to another Member State.” 
34  Other purposes for spontaneous exchange of information are: a) existence of grounds for suspecting tax loss 
occurring in the receiving Member State; b) deduction or exemption in a Member State that may affect taxing rights 
of the receiving Member State; c) existence of grounds for suspecting the use of artificial profits transfers amongst 
members of a multinational corporation, and d) usefulness of information for the assessment of tax liability. See: 
Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 9(1). 
35  In particular, information regarding income from employment, director’s fees, certain life insurance products, 
pensions, and ownership of and income from immovable property received after 1 January 2014 by residents of the 
receiving Member State. By 1 July 2017, before which the Commission has to issue an overview report of the 
cooperation, these taxable objects will be added as to include dividends, capital gains, and royalties See: 
Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 7(1) juncto Article 8(5). 
36  Article 3 point 9 of Administrative Coop. Directive defines ‘automatic exchange’ as “the systematic communication 
of predefined information to another Member State, without prior request, at pre-established regular intervals.” 
37  The European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to 
anti-money-laundering information by tax authorities, COM(2016) 452. 
38  id., proposed insertion of paragraph (1a) of Article 1 of the Administrative Cooperation Directive. 
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2.2. Transparency and usefulness of information stored within the CRB 
The holding of a CRB corresponds to the Commission’s agenda for Fair Corporate 
Taxation,39 particularly with due regards to establishing tax transparency. Tax transparency has 
been upheld as one of the three pillars of the EU Commission’s agenda for Fair Corporate Taxation, 
alongside establishing effective taxation and better business environment.40 Historically, an EU-
wide automatic exchange of information was introduced through the enactment of Council 
Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003.41 The Directive operates as to oblige automatic data transfer 
amongst Member States, particularly when savings interests are paid by paying agents to individual 
residents of the EU.42 Within later stages, exchange of information has also been used as instrument 
for the recovery of tax claims through the provisions laid down in the Mutual Assistance Directive. 
Under that directive, a requested authority of a Member State is obliged to provide information that 
are  relevant to the recovery of tax claims by requesting authority of another Member State.  
An expanded EU cooperation on automatic exchange of information took place after the 
Administrative Cooperation Directive was enacted. Similar to the Mutual Assistance Directive, this 
directive obliges a requested authority in a Member State to, with certain exceptions, provide 
information that are of foreseeable relevance to the requesting authority in another Member State in 
the administration and enforcement of domestic tax laws of the latter Member State. In this 
directive, exchange of information among Member States is classified based on its scope of 
application, and comprises of exchange of information on request, mandatory automatic exchange 
of information, and spontaneous exchange of information. As observed by Helminen,43 the 
Administrative Cooperation Directive was issued due to practices of cross-border tax avoidance 
which leads to “(…) budget losses and prevents proper assessment of taxes and, thus, may distort 
the proper operation of the internal market.”  
It is admitted by the Council that management of a Member State’s internal tax system cannot 
be properly performed without receiving information from other Member States.44 In this context, 
the subsidiarity [SIC] principle of the TFEU requires that since an efficient administrative 
cooperation between Member States to overcome the negative effects of globalization cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States themselves, then it is better be achieved at the EU 
level.45 The Administrative Cooperation Directive, therefore, marks the EU’s firm and extensive 
move towards fiscal transparency and information exchange.46 Amendments to the directive include 
extensions of its scope to financial account information,47 information on cross-border tax rulings 
and advance pricing arrangements,48 and country-by-country reporting.49 Along with the 
information stored in the CRB, information obtained within the information exchange cooperation 
ensure the establishment of tax transparency within the EU. 
                                                        
39  The European Commission, “Commission’s Agenda for the Fair Corporate Taxation in the EU”, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/anti_tax_avoid
ance/timeline_without_logo.png [last access 20 June 2017]. It does not, however, encompass tax avoidance. The 
2016 Anti-Avoidance Directive makes reference primarily to  the 15 OECD Actions against BEPS. 
40  The European Commission, id. 
41  Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments, 
[2003] OJ L 157/38, or the Savings Directive. 
42  Alicja Brodzka, “Automatic Exchange of Tax Information in the European Union–The Standard for the Future”, 56 
European Taxation 1, January 2016, at p.27. 
43  Marjaana Helminen, 2015. EU Tax Law–Direct Taxation, IBFD, Amsterdam, at p.318. 
44  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Preamble para. [2]. 
45  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Preamble para. [29]. 
46  Alicja Brodzka, supra 42, p.30. 
47  Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards Mandatory 
Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, [2014] OJ L359/1. 
48  Council Directive 2015/2376/EU of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards Mandatory 
Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, [2015] OJ L332/1. 
49  Council Directive 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards Mandatory Exchange of 
Information in the Field of Taxation, [2016] OJ L146/8. 
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Meanwhile, the usefulness of the CRB in identifying beneficial owners can be explained by 
the Commission’s efforts to enhance rules on public access to beneficial ownership information. 
The 2016 proposal to amend the 4AMLD has developed rules concerning access to data and 
information stored in the CRB. In this regard, Council Directive 2016/225850 has obliged Member 
States to grant tax authorities access to mechanisms, procedures, documents, and information 
collected by virtue of the 4AMLD, including beneficial ownership information as registered within 
the CRB. In addition, recent developments on the draft amendment to the 4AMLD suggested that 
information on the name, date of birth, nationality, business or service address, beneficial owner’s 
country of residence, and the nature and extent of the beneficial interests held should be publicly 
available.51 In the case of trusts that represent “(…) property held by or on behalf of a person 
carrying on a business which consists of or includes the management of trusts, and acting as trustee 
of a trust in the course of that business with a view to gain profit (…)”,52 access to the CRB is 
restricted to “parties holding legitimate interest.” 
Within the Fifth Presidency Compromise to the proposed amendment to the 4AMLD, the 
legitimate interest requirement has been addressed in multiple occasions. Amongst the most notable 
addresses by the Council is its affirmation that a person having demonstrated a legitimate interest 
should be granted access into the CRB for the purpose of “(…) trust in the integrity of the financial 
system”, and in order to assist criminal proceedings on money laundering, associated predicate 
offences and terrorist financing.53 While omitting tax authorities of third states as persons having 
legitimate interests, the Council had ordered Member States to establish their own definitions and 
criteria of persons having legitimate interests.54 This includes any negative lists of such persons, if a 
Member State wishes to formulate so. A problem persists when an entity of a Member State, having 
a legitimate interest in the Member State in which it is located, is not granted access to information 
concerning another entity in a different Member State through the interconnected CRB for the sole 
reason that the former entity is not, according to the laws of the Member State in which the latter 
entity is located, a person with legitimate interest. This is true, as the Council affirmed that “(…) 
both national and cross-border access to each Member State’s register shall be granted based on the 
definition of legitimate interest of the Member State where the corporate or other legal entity is 
incorporated or where the trust or similar legal arrangement is administered.”55  
Based on the above elaboration in subsection 2.2., it can be concluded that transparency of the 
CRB regime is manifested by the ongoing exchange of information cooperation, particularly 
amongst EU Member States. Rules and regulations on such cooperation have been linked to the 
efforts in establishing a CRB. The holding of a CRB corresponds to the bigger EU agenda of 
establishing tax transparency, being one of the three pillars of the EU Commission’s agenda for Fair 
Corporate Taxation. Meanwhile, the usefulness of the CRB in identifying beneficial owners lies 
within its rules in accessing data and information within the CRB, including the access granted tax 
authorities of Member State in which the CRB is held. However, whether the access would be 
granted restrictively to persons with legitimate interests or publicly available remains to be decided 
by the legislative bodies of the EU. One drawback of the “legitimate interests” requirement is that 
the term ‘persons with legitimate interests’ may be defined differently in different Member States, 
and thus, granting access to these persons may become more difficult than it should be. 
                                                        
50  Council Directive 2016/2258/EU of 6 December 2016 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards access to anti-
money laundering information by tax authorities, [2016] OJ L342/1. 
51  The European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, 9 March 2017, A8-0056/2017, p.66. 
52  The European Commission, id., p.17. See also, The European Parliament, id., at p.98. The Parliament added that “a 
legitimate interest could be envisaged where the beneficial owner or the trustee has a public function or has had a 
public function in the last five years.” 
53  The European Council, Fifth Presidency Compromise to COM(2016)450, supra 10, at Preamble paragraph [22]. 
54  The European Council, id., at Preamble paragraph [35]. 
55  The European Council, id., at Preamble paragraph [35]. 
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2.3. Protection of personal information stored within the CRB 
Another factor that supports the use of CRB as model instrument in unveiling beneficial 
ownership is its capability of protecting personal information. It should first be noted that references 
to EU secondary laws on data protection of natural persons can be made to General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR)56 and Directive (EU) 2016/680.57 While the former law applies to the 
processing of personal data and rules related to free movement of data,58 the latter is particularly 
intended for the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of, among 
others, prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences.59 The scope of 
these laws are distinguished based on the purpose and principal processing actors. Within the 
proposed amendment to the 4AMLD, Directive (EU) 2016/680 was explicitly mentioned in 
paragraph 32 of the Preamble. The Presidency-compromised texts had also included a new 
objective of protecting personal information stored within the CRB.60 
General limitations on the use of CRB by persons with legitimate interests may be inferred 
from the GDPR. Paragraph 111 of the Preamble to the GDPR explains: 
“(…) Provision should also be made for the possibility for transfers where important grounds of public 
interest laid down by Union or Member State law so require or where the transfer is made from a 
register established by law and intended for consultation by the public or persons having a legitimate 
interest. In the latter case, such a transfer should not involve the entirety of the personal data or entire 
categories of the data contained in the register and, when the register is intended for consultation by 
persons having a legitimate interest, the transfer should be made only at the request of those persons 
or, if they are to be the recipients, taking into full account the interests and fundamental rights of the 
data subject.” 
This provision accords with the proposed amendment of the 4 AMLD which included the use 
of data and information contained in central registration of beneficial owners in each Member State. 
Paragraph 112 of the Preamble to the GDPR continues: 
“Those derogations should in particular apply to data transfers required and necessary for important 
reasons of public interest, for example in cases of international data exchange between competition 
authorities, tax or customs administrations, between financial supervisory authorities (…)” 
The protection of personal information stored within the CRB is primarily related to the 
storage and transmission of information. Issues within information storage mainly concerns the 
necessity to provide technical specifications for the interconnection of CRB, particularly: a) the 
technical specification defining the set of the technical data necessary for the platform to perform its 
functions as well as the method of storage, use and protection of such data; b) common criteria 
according to which beneficial ownership information is available through the system of 
interconnection of registers; c) the technical details on how the information on beneficial owners is 
to be made available; and d) the technical conditions of availability of services provided by the 
system of interconnection of registers.61 
                                                        
56  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
57  Directive 2016/680/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, [2016] OJ L 119/89. 
58  Article 1(1) GDPR, supra 56. 
59  Article 1(1) Directive (EU) 2016/680, supra 57. 
60  The European Council, Fifth Presidency Compromise to COM(2016)450, supra 10, at Preamble paragraph [29]. The 
Council confers “with the same aim of ensuring a proportionate and balanced approach and to guarantee the rights 
to private life and personal data protection, Member States may provide for exemptions to the disclosure of and to 
the access to beneficial ownership information in the registers, in exceptional circumstances, where the information 
would expose the beneficial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, violence or intimidation.” 
61  The European Council, Fifth Presidency Compromise to COM(2016)450, supra 10, proposed Article 31(a). 
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A rather more problematic issue concerns transmission of information, particularly within the 
exchange of information cooperation. As a general rule, information exchange cooperation for tax 
purposes insofar as expressly authorized by the EU organs and domestic tax laws of Member States. 
These derogations must, however, take into account the general concepts of profiling for data 
protection purposes, as set out in Paragraph 71 of the Preamble to the GDPR: 
(…) decision-making based on such processing, including profiling, should be allowed where 
expressly authorized by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject, including for 
fraud and tax-evasion monitoring (…).  
Other than by provisions of the laws, acquisition and transmission of taxpayers data within 
information exchange cooperation for tax purposes are also bound by principles upheld in case laws 
of the Court of Justice of the EU. In this regard, Paragraph 34 of Schrems (Case C-362/14):62 
“The right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter and by the core values 
common to the traditions of the Member States, would be rendered meaningless if the State authorities 
were authorized to access electronic communications on a casual and generalized basis without any 
objective justification based on considerations of national security or the prevention of crime that are 
specific to the individual concerned and without those practices being accompanied by appropriate and 
verifiable safeguards.” [emphasis added]. 
The above rules and principles serve as general limitations on the use of taxpayers 
information within the exchange of information cooperation. These rules and principles must then 
be manifested into the rules on transmission of information and other detailed limitations. 
2.3.a. Safe transmission of personal information stored within the CRB 
According to Brodzka,63 the primary obstacles towards the exchange of information in the EU 
are the lack of experience in managing all of the phases within the data exchange, which may affect 
safe and proper storage of information bulk received and transmitted during the exchange. In this 
regard, modes of information exchange within the Administrative Cooperation Directive comprised 
of exchange of information by request, automatic exchange of information, and spontaneous 
exchange of information. Separate procedures apply for each mode of exchange. Within exchange 
of information by request, the requesting Member State initiates the information exchange by filing 
a standardized form, including any appendices such as reports, statements, and certified true 
copies.64 This request must include the identity of the person under examination or investigation 
and the tax purpose for which the information is requested, and where identified, the name and 
address of the person in the requested state that might possess the information.65 Thus, a request 
may not be conducted in casual and general fashion. 
Pursuant to the request, the requested authority must promptly provide the information within 
six months after the receipt of the request, unless the requested information is already in possession 
of the requested authority for which the time limit is shortened into two months.66 In responding to 
the request, the requested authority must use its domestic measures in order to obtain the requested 
information, even if such information would not be useful for its own use.67 Furthermore, the 
requested authority may not refuse to supply information solely because the information is held for 
example by financial institutions, or because the information relates to ownership interests in a 
person.68 At this point, it is possible that the requesting authority go beyond what is necessary to 
attain the objective of the information exchange, or in other words, being disproportionate.  
                                                        
62  Court of Justice of the European Union, Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 6 October 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
63  Alicja Brodzka, supra 42, at p.30. 
64  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 5 juncto Article 20(1). 
65  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 20(2). 
66  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 7(1). 
67  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 18(1). 
68  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 18(2). 
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Meanwhile, both the spontaneous exchange of information and automatic exchange of 
information use standard computerized format based on the existing format used in the Savings 
Directive, including its entailing mechanisms of administrative notification and feedback.69 
Practical arrangements within the Administrative Cooperation Directive require that any 
information communicated through any mode is conducted by electronic means using the Common 
Communication Network (CCN network).70 The network, which has legal bases in Decision 
Number 1482/2007/EC and Decision No 624/2007/EC,71 supports for communications by way of 
message-based interface, interactive access, and email system, which includes national 
administration and EU officials as data subjects.72 
An issue may arise when information exchange cooperation involves data transmission from 
and to third states. As a rule of thumb, information received by Member State by virtue of an 
agreement with third country and may be useful for the enforcement of domestic tax laws of 
another Member State, may be transmitted to that other Member State, in so far as it is not restricted 
by the mentioned agreement.73 The Most Favored Nation clause in Article 19 of Administrative 
Cooperation Directive also obliges Member State having wider cooperation with third states to 
extend such cooperation with the other Member States. This may increase the inbound flow of 
information into the EU. Vis-à-vis, competent authorities of a Member State may transmit 
information it receives from another Member State to a third country, provided that that other 
Member State has given its consent to such transmission, and that that third country has sufficiently 
establish “(…) the irregular or illegal nature of transactions which appear to contravene  or 
constitute an abuse of tax legislation”,74 or in other words, having a legitimate aim to use the 
information. Again, protection of taxpayers data have been thought of by the EU organs. 
Based on the elaboration in sub-subsection 2.3.a, it can be concluded that while proceedings 
conducted by tax  authorities of Member States may be beyond taxpayers’ ownership interests, rules 
and instruments on information exchange cooperation have been designed as to ensure that every 
information exchanged is safely transmitted within the EU borders. Transmission to states outside 
the EU borders are only possible with restrictions, while incoming information from third states 
have been made lenient. This divergent interpretation of reciprocity with third country marks the 
EU’s convergent view towards efficient yet secured tax information exchange within its borders. 
2.3.b. Limitations on personal information for information exchange cooperation purposes 
Several aspects of limitations on information exchange has been mentioned in the above sub-
sections. In this sub-section, further limitations on the functioning of the information exchange 
cooperation will be discussed. First, Article 25 of the Administrative Cooperation Directive confers: 
All exchange of information pursuant to this Directive shall be subject to the provisions implementing 
Directive 95/46/EC. However, Member States shall, for the purpose of the correct application of this 
Directive, restrict the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in Article 10, Article 11(1), 
Articles 12 and 21 of Directive 95/46/EC to the extent required in order to safeguard the interests 
referred to in Article 13(1)(e) of that Directive. 
                                                        
69  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 20(3) juncto Article 20(4). 
70  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 21(1). The CCN is developed by the Union for all transmissions by 
electronic means between competent authorities in the areas of customs and taxation (Article 3 point 13). 
71  Decision Number 1482/2007/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 11 November 2007  establishing a 
Community programme to improve the operation of taxation systems in the internal market (Fiscalis 2013); 
Decision No 624/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23May 2007 establishing an action 
programme for customs in the Community (Customs 2013). See also: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/2378 of 15 December 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council 
Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 1156/2012, [2015] OJ L332/19. 
72  The European Commission, Data Protection officer–DPO-3318.3 CCN user management, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dpo-register/details.htm?id=38087 [last access on 20 June 2017]. 
73  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 24(1). 
74  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 24(2). 
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This provision serves as the general data protection rule for the information exchange. It 
makes reference to the previous GDPR. In short, the cross-referenced provisions refer to the 
prudential acts of the controller when receiving and transmitting information, the data subject’s 
rights to access the processed information, and Member States’ obligations to publicize the 
processing of data. Applied contextually to the information exchange cooperation, Article 25 of the 
Administrative Cooperation Directive confines that applications of the GDPR provisions may be 
derogated for the purpose of safeguarding “(…) an important economic or financial interest of a 
Member State or of the European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters.”75 
While the information exchange modes are protected by the use of CCN, taxpayers’ right to access 
the processed information and the publications of processing by Member States remain uncertain. 
Second, Article 16(1) of the Administrative Cooperation Directive confers that information 
communicated within the information exchange cooperation of any modes should enjoy official 
secrecy and protection to similar information in accordance with national laws of the Member 
States. As such, the use of information received within that cooperation is limited to: a) 
administration and enforcement of domestic laws of the Member States concerning taxes listed in 
the Directive; b) assessment and enforcement of taxes listed within the Mutual Assistance 
Directive; c) assessment and enforcement of compulsory social security contributions; d) judicial 
and administrative proceedings resulted from infringements of tax laws; and e) invocation as 
evidence by the competent authorities of Member States by virtue of national treatment.76 
Third, equally important limitations on the operation of information exchange cooperation is 
that any information requested by a requesting authority of a Member State must be on the basis 
that such authority has “(…) exhausted the usual sources of information which it could have used in 
the circumstances for obtaining the information requested, without running the risk of jeopardizing 
the achievement of its objectives.”77 In addition, the requested authority of a Member State may 
decline any transmission of information if: a) it would be contrary to its legislation to collect such 
information or administrative enquiries thereof (Article 19(2)); b) the requesting Member State fails 
to provide similar information under its domestic tax laws (Article 19(3)); and c) it would lead to 
disclosure of a commercial, industrial or professional secret or of commercial process, or of 
information which disclosure would be against the public policy (Article 19(5)). 
Based on the above elaboration in sub-subsection 2.3.b., it can be concluded that limitations 
against information exchange cooperation are having the purpose to balance the vast power 
attributed to tax authorities of Member States in acquiring information regarding taxpayers. It is 
conclusive that any information concerning taxpayers other than their ownership interests on 
business secrecies78 may be acquired and transmitted for information exchange purposes. 
Procedural limitations on the acquisition and utilization of such information ensure that processing 
of information do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives of administration and 
enforcement of Member States’ tax laws. Coherently, secure transmission of information ensure 
that information concerning taxpayers are not intervened or misused by unauthorized parties. 
Furthermore, it can also be concluded that the taxation purpose of information exchange 
cooperation requires the balancing of competing interests between safeguarding proper functioning 
of Member States’ budgetary systems and the need to protect acquisition and information of 
personal data. Provisions of the Administrative Cooperation Directive have been designed as to 
provide tax authorities with wide array of evidence when enforcing their domestic tax laws, but at 
the same time being coherent to the EU-wide secondary laws concerning protection of data. 
                                                        
75  Article 13(1)(c) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
76  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 16(1) juncto Article 16(5). 
77  Administrative Cooperation Directive, Article 17(1). 
78  In the case of corporate groups operating in different Member States, it is likely that commercial secrets and 
industrial or professional secret or of commercial process will be subject to laws on transfer pricing documentation. 
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Based on the elaborations in this subsection 2.3, it can be concluded that the EU tax 
transparency agenda takes into account protection of taxpayers data to the extents expressly 
governed in the Administrative Cooperation Directive and the GDPR. As a rule of thumb, the 
qualities and quantities of taxpayers data and information acquired and transmitted within the 
exchange of information are indefinite insofar as other limitations are fulfilled. These limitations 
include: a) the legitimate use of information as to prevent casual and general use of personal data; 
b) the proportionate acquisition of information as to prevent abuse of power by tax authorities when 
acquiring and transmitting information; and c) the secure transmission of information as to prevent 
misuse by unauthorized parties. Another important limitation is the secure transmission of 
information acquired in the EU to third states. In order to enhance protection of taxpayers data, due 
regards may be attributed to the specification of information that can be acquired and transmitted 
within the cooperation. An exhaustive list of transmissible information will provide more legal 
certainty for taxpayers. 
3. Conclusion 
Based on the elaborations in the previous sections, and as the answer to the central question of 
this paper, it can be concluded that the CRB can be used as a model instrument in unveiling 
beneficial owners for tax treaty purposes, for three reasons. First, data and information stored in the 
CRB are comprehensive, as they include details on the legal and economic nature of cross-border 
business. Second, data and information stored in the CRB are transparent and have practical uses, as 
persons with legitimate interests may, with limitations, be granted access to the CRB. Such limited 
access to the CRB results in the third reason to propose CRB as a model instrument in unveiling 
beneficial owners, namely that the CRB ensures high protection of individuals’ privacy. The 
established links amongst rules and regulations on exchange of information for tax purposes, data 
protection, and anti-money laundering have improved the usefulness of the CRB in unveiling 
beneficial ownership for tax purposes. Third, protection of taxpayers’ privacy is ensured by 
measures to prevent misuse of taxpayers information, including rules and instruments on safe 
transmission of information. It should be born in mind that data and information stored in the CRB 
are not in themselves able to solve the issue as whether an interposed person is beneficial owner of 
certain income distributed through it, because determination of beneficial ownership for tax treaty 
purposes require scrutiny of factual circumstances that might not be recorded in the CRB. 
